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Security of the Nation:
Why Do We Need ‘Mothers of Martyrs1’ in Turkey?
-Esra Gedik
Introduction:
Discussing and defining major political issues in Turkey through the lens of national
security has inevitably brought the Kurdish Question, which has always been perceived as a
“security” issue created by an “internal enemy” and in the past 30 years has also been
perceived as a “terrorism” problem. There has been an armed conflict between the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish armed forces (TAF) for over 30 years. The
armed conflict has inflicted heavy material and moral damages on the region, on Kurds in
particular, and on the entire society in Turkey in general. It is obvious that the conflict has
caused human loses. Those who fulfilled their military service in the region and public
officials who served in the security sector have died in the conflict. Therefore, the
government, media, Kurdish and Turkish politicians, intellectuals, and non-governmental
entities have started to focus more on mothers, both mothers of soldiers and mothers of
PKK members, since the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, in 1999. 2 In
Turkey, women, especially mothers, became a “symbol of the struggle against the PKK.”
Before, they were only “ordinary” housewives, but with martyrdom they have become
“mothers of the nation,” known to everyone and respected by statesmen and commanders.
Motherhood has been used not only as a strategy for deepening nationalist discourse, but
also as a strategy for countering the issue of Kurdish nationalism based on national security.
With the trial of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the "relatives of martyrs" (şehit yakınları), as
they came to be known, began to organize themselves and used anti-PKK sentiments at
every opportunity, most notably in the courtroom where some of the families sat while
Öcalan was being tried. They internalize the nationalist and militarist structure with
conventional subjectification as mothers in Turkey. Mothers’ demonstrations become
politically powerful because the women are performing their culturally appropriate role as
“good” mothers and bearing witness to their own maternal suffering.
As Burcu Şentürk (2009: 93) says, “In the political context of conflict between the
PKK and TAF in Turkey, the soldiers of the TAF are represented as the defenders of the
honor of the Turkish nation against the ‘traitors.’” Besides, the mothers of these soldiers are
portrayed as the mothers of the Turkish nation who raised loyal citizens for it. Through their
motherhoods, these women are expected to support their sons’ mission as the protectors of
the “motherland.” Thus, they become mothers as objects of wars who contribute to the
continuity of warlike/militarist activities. These mothers are instrumentalized for dealing
with the Kurdish problems through national security. The instrumental use of gendered
stereotypes in the name of national security becomes most evident in the intimate
interrelationship of nationalism and mothers of martyrs.
In this context, I want to evaluate how expressions of grief of mothers who lost their
soldier sons in armed conflict in Turkey are used for discourse about the security of the
1

Mother of Martyr is a concept that is used to identify mothers of soldiers who died in the armed conflict in
the East and Southeast of Turkey.
2
For the scope of this article, I will only discuss mothers of soldiers in Turkish army forces.
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nation in Turkey since relations of mothers and sons in the shadow of war concerns the
public domain and mothers’ role in the security of the nation. My main argument is that
although these women lost their loved ones in an armed conflict because of their “new
status” as “mothers of martyrs,” they do not question the conflict process but welcome the
nationalist discourse of martyrdom based on national security in Turkey. I argue that one of
the reasons why mothers of martyrs are needed is that these women I conducted interviews
with were considered themselves, and their dead sons, as sanctified, and these women are
placated by martyrdom discourse constructed by religion and nationalism in Turkey.
Secondly, many other actors having impact on making national security policies in Turk ey
use mothers of martyrs’ grief and their willingness for revenge for the death of their loved
ones. In other words, as their sons died for the nation, the big family, they are now accepted
as the sons of the nation and these mothers are considered mothers of the nation. Thus, the
things done in the armed conflict for the sake of national security and the peace negotiation
process, in one way, are justified since it is said that we, as a nation, owe this to these
mothers who lost their loved ones for our own security.
Although the subject of research is related “mothers of martyrs,” the subject, itself, is
related with nationalism, and religion. Below, I will discuss relation between nationalism and
religion in the context of martyrdom.
Methodological Approach:
This study uses a feminist methodological approach, a feminist standpoint
perspective. The primary methodological tool of the feminist standpoint is the feminist
evaluation of women’s own experiences. In a society in which women are considered
secondary and oppressed, experiences of women are affected by patriarchy. Hence, we
cannot examine these experiences that are constructed and affected by patriarchy by using
traditional methodological ways. Many feminists argue that the true voice of women, the
women's experience, has been embedded in a traditionally "male" work. As the field of social
research has, at least until recently, been dominated by males, the equation linking "male
research" with objectivity and social distance is an obvious one. In fact, many feminist
scholars argue that the very instruments designed as "objective" do nothing more than
reinforce a male dominated worldview which fetishizes the rational, measurable, neutral and
objective. Feminist scholars feel that the dominant paradigms contain a pervasive male bias
characterized by objectivity, scientific "neutrality" and a hierarchical, distanced, essentially
authoritative relationship between the "Researcher/Expert" and "His" subjects. Researchers
who rely exclusively or even very strongly on objective measures are felt to be identified with
this predominantly "male" mode of analysis. Such modes of analysis, it is felt, necessarily
inhibit an understanding of women's experiences.
As a response, a feminist orientation to research grounds its focus on women's
experiences, using these experiences as an indicator of the "reality" against which hypotheses
are tested (Harding, 1986:6-7). With the feminist methodology, it is intended to reach the
knowledge which is free from impact of patriarchy. According to Beverly Skeggs (1994: 77),
feminist research is distinct from non-feminist research because it “begins from the premise
that the nature of reality in western society is unequal and hierarchical.” In a similar way,
Ramazanoğlu and Holland (2002: 2-3) note that “feminist research is imbued with particular
theoretical, political and ethical concerns that make these varied approaches to social
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research distinctive.”
Feminist perspectives suggest taking a broader view. This research aims “to correct
both the invisibility and distortion of female experience in ways relevant to ending women’s
unequal social position. This entails the substantive task of making gender a fundamental
category for our understanding of the social order, ‘to see the world from women’s place in
it’” (Lather 1988: 571). Hence, what distinguishes this study as a feminist study is t hat
feminist methods do not lie in the choice of research questions alone, but are tied to
questions about how data will be collected, presented and used. As a feminist study, there is
“the acknowledgment of the reciprocal sharing of knowledge and experience between the
researcher and the researched” (Shields and Dervin 1993: 67). With this way, this study plans
to undo the conventional dichotomies and hierarchies in the research situation. The process
entails not only speaking with and listening to women, but also demands that the researcher
share the research project with participants, involving them at each phase of the research and
including their input in the interpretation of results. As a result, the features of feminist
research, including placing value on women’s experiences and subjectivities, the critical
analysis of gender, reflexivity, and the emancipatory motivation, come together in interesting
ways in the study of women’s experiences.
Aiming to find answers to suggested research questions, I plan to conduct in-depth
interviews. I have decided to use in-depth interviewing as the main method to collect data
for the study since a qualitative is adopted for the investigation. The central concern of the
interpretative research understands women’s experiences. Shulamit Reinharz (1992: 19)
explains how interviewing is a way feminist researchers have attempted to access women’s
hidden knowledge:
Interviewing offers researchers access to people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in
their own words rather than in the words of the researcher. This asset is particularly
important for the study of women because in this way learning from women is an
antidote to centuries of ignoring women’s ideas altogether or having men speaks for
women. (cited in Hesse-Biber, 2006: 118)
Hence, this study uses in-depth interview methods to learn women’s own experiences from
the women’s side, and by this way I plan feminist research not on women, but for women.
At the beginning, I chose mothers from Şehit Aileleri Federasyonu (ŞAF)3 who may talk
about their experiences and the experiences of others. For that reason, I went to the
organization once or twice in three weeks. I tried to be a participant observer for a while.
Then, I went to cemetery of martyrs in Cebeci/Ankara in Turkey on Fridays to find mothers
of martyrs since those mothers’ “new home in which they spend most of their time, has
become cemetery.” In a final step, I relied on a snowball method to talk to mothers in
Merzifon/Amasya, Havza/Samsun and Suluova/Amasya in Turkey. I interviewed nineteen
people, fourteen mothers of martyrs, three fathers of martyrs and two wives of martyrs.
Because of the socio-demographic structure of the region, although I did not plan to
compare Sunni mothers and Alevi mothers, the interpretations of the narratives are based on

3

Association of Families of Martyrs.
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the differences of Sunni Islam4 and Alevi thought.5 The narratives of these people proved to
be an interesting case to show how personal narratives interact, overlap or contest with the
hegemonic nationalist discourses about them and war.
Mothers, Nations and Mothers of Nation:
The literature review about mothers and motherhood reveals many different
discussion topics, including working mothers, “bad” mothers, black mothers or lesbian
mothers and so on. What is striking about the discussion to date is the absence of an explicit
definition of motherhood in most, if not all, of the literature. Aspects of motherhood and
qualities of mothers, actual and imagined, are described, but the concept itself is not
subjected to a rigorous interrogation. Motherhood, enveloped with beliefs and values, is
institutionalized not only in marriage and family arrangements and practices, but also in law
and social policy and through representations in literature, film, and other cultural forms
(Kaplan, 1992). For Walker (1995: 418), the international debate has exposed shortcomings
in commonsense views of motherhood as “naturally” the role of women. More noteworthy,
there is a degree of agreement on the content of motherhood: it is to nurture, to preserve, to
protect.
All nationalist projects involve a remaking of femininities and masculinities, with an
ambivalent set of opportunities and restrictions for both. Questions of woman are central to
all debates in a nation-building process. In that context, nationalist movements across the
world employ mothers as a symbol of the nation (Mayer, 2000). Hence, the building of a
nation involves different interventions and inscription upon female identity, whether
through the assignment of forged roles such as mother, all serving one way or another the
There are four Sunni sects in Islam: Hanafi, Shafi´i, Maliki, and Hanbali. The Hanafi sect is the l argest
of the four, and its followers comprise 45% of the enti re Islamic world. It takes its name from its
founder, Ebu Hanife (Numan bin Sabit) (699-767), and is widespread in Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,
Turkey, Indi a, and Pakistan. Sunni Islam itself takesits name from its identification with the
importance of the Sunna (the examples from the hadiths). There are many small religious differences,
and some large differences, Sunni Islam and the other orientations. For ins tance, Sunni Islam rev eres
Ali, but does not hold him up as the only true continuation of the tradition from Muhammad, and has
no emphasis on his bringing a divine light from the Prophet (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2006: 31).
4

Alevism can be primarily understood as a syncretistic heterodox identity, as along with Islam,
Zoroas trianism (Iranian), Shamanism, Maniheism, Christiani ty, and so on. It has many more elements
of pre-Islamic Turkish and Iranian religions than Sunni Islam does. For example, prayer (namaz), the
fast in Ramadan, ti thing (zakat), and the hajj are alien practices in most Alevi communi ties. Instead,
they have their own religious ceremonies (cem), officiated by holy men (dede) belonging to a
heredi tary pries tly caste. As among other schismatic Shi'i groups, 'Ali and the Safavid Shah Isma'il are
deified, or at leas t idolized. Instead of adherence to the Shari'a, Alevis profess obedience to a s et of
simple moral norms; they claim to live according to the inner (batin) meaning of religion rather than
its external (zahir) demands.
There is a noticeable conflict among Alevi groups in that it is “represented” differently based on the
ideological dominations. The fi rst group focuses on the religious side of Alevism, defining it as an
Islamic sect and a part of Islam. This group uses the term “Alevi Islam,” and mos t of them try to
pres ent Alevism as true Islam, or Turkish Islam. The Second group di rects Alevis to abandon their
religious identity. This group puts emphasize on sources other than Islam, Iranian of Turkish basis
(Şahin,
http://www.alevihaber.org/v2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=263&Itemid=39).
5
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formation of a sense of nationhood.
There are several reasons why women become such a target toward the building of a
new nation. The significance of mothers is "the main vehicle through which people first
form their identities and learn their place in society" (Forcey, 1994: 357). Women are
mothers, are life givers, and are mothers of next generations, mothers of the nation. Nira
Yuval Davis and Flora Anthias (2003) have suggested that women’s relation to nation has
taken at least five major forms. Women serve as biological reproducers of national groups
(the biological mothers of the people); as symbols and signifiers of national difference in
male discourse; as transmitters and producers of the cultural narratives themselves (mothers,
teachers, writers…); as reproducers of the boundaries of the nation; as active participants in
national movements: in armies, congress, community organizations. In that point, Joanne
Nagel expresses,
Nation is a kind of family where man, as a head of family, and woman, as
a mother, play their natural roles. Women have a crucial place as mothers
of nation while they are dominated by nationalist movements and politics.
(Cited in Şerifsoy, 2004: 171)
According to Natarajan, women shape national imagination (Cited in Saigol, 2004: 232). For
her, “woman, with her status of being mother, evoke unity and integrity of a nation.” She
adds,
How does figure of mother unify the nation? “Mother” reminds common
cultural roots (provides a shelter and food). Like soil, mother is eternal,
patient, and indispensable. National demands are supported with solid
demands. (Cited in Saigol, 2004: 233)
Since a role of mothers is to raise new generations and implant cultural values,
motherhood has been mostly used in order to indicate internal and dominated cultural
territory for new born nations. Gaitskell and Unterhal (Cited in Saigol, 2004:233) point out
in their study about African nationalism that the idea of motherhood has changed during the
20th century and added that motherhood is not only a fixed biological concept but also a
flexible expression. For Yuval-Davis and Anthias, “women do not only teach and transfer
the national cultural and ideological traditions, but also mostly, they form them.” Mothers
play an important role in re-creating the differences between ethnic-national groups. They
convey culture and they are privileged signifiers showing national differences. Mothering as
ultimately attributed to the whole nation’s sake stems from the duties of mothers to the
family, society and nation. In that sense, mothers are envisaged as women who carry the
genuineness of the nation in a private sphere. Badinter claims,
19 th century ideologues that are completely sure about their certainty have
benefited from theory of mother’s being “naturally altruistic” in expanding
mother’s responsibilities even more. (…) Women are told that they are the
watchdog of ethnic and religion and that the destiny of family and society
depend on their way of rearing children. (Cited in Uluğtekin, 2002: 58)
Therefore, in or out of war, mothers play socially attributed roles such as being the
mothers raising or giving birth to sons who will be soldiers (martyrs) for the sake of their
country and provide health, sexual, nutrition and nursing services to the men in war (Enloe,
1990). Motherhood is attributed to the whole nation’s sake from the duties of mothers to the
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society and nation. In that sense, the experiences and lives of mothers are shadowed with a
manipulated sacrifice since what is important is to rear “good” children for the system.
While women are lauded as “mothers of nation,” they are pacified and limited within this
role. These kinds of roles, on one hand, points out that mothers are burdened with the roles
by patriarchal society. On the other hand, with motherhood, a woman is expected to support
the man, who is “protector” for both them and the country where they live in; mothers as
objects of wars contribute to continuity of warlike/militarist activities. This stresses that man
is depicted as the warrior-hero or citizen-warrior, entrusted with the almost sacred duty to
defend the homeland.
For example, Palestinians, like in Turkey, commonly refer to those who have died for
national cause as martyrs and to mothers who have lost children as mothers of martyrs. The
national movement endowed the “mothers of martyrs” with the status of national icons
(Peteet, 1997: 105). As far as concerns Peteet (1997), in Palestine like in Turkey, it is assumed
as a national duty to bear many children to replenish wartime losses. In doing so, they locate
their reproductive abilities in a national political context. While nationalist discourse
celebrates them as icons of the nation, they are celebrating their reproductive potential.
Although the mother of the martyr may not have been active politically in the sense of
belonging to an organization, nationalist discourse transforms her maternal sacrifice into a
supreme political act. Mothers of martyrs are invited to attend resistance celebrations with
the leadership, a public, symbolic display of a newly acquired stature in the community
(Peteet, 1997: 122).
On the other hand, Marco says that mothers of Plazo de Mayo are not only mothers
of their own sons, but also they have become mothers of the whole society and it was
indicated that they represent the idea of “social motherhood,” which rebelled against
political parties and military government in Argentina. Marco quoted from Schmukler:
“After this event in Argentina, we can not articulate motherhood with political passiveness
and succumbing anymore” (Cited in Olgun and Yüksel, 1991: 57). In Argentina, mothers
have constructed their own agency that is different from dominant structures and discourses
in the country in that era. Like in Turkey, in Argentina, the natural role for woman is being
wife and mother (Fisher, 1995:5). However, they resisted the dictatorship and transformed
women’s view of Argentinian society and their agency in it. The structure in Argentina was
military rule while mothers of disappeared occurred. However, it was the condition that
constructed those mothers; those women were brought together by the disappearances. It
was a force of opposition to the military rule. Women became more conscious of the
dimensions of the repression and this made them more determined. Mothers forced to
modify their traditional role as mothers and changed their perceptions of their roles within
the society. They were challenging the traditional ideology of motherhood, an ideology most
commonly found in the moral discourse of the military (Fisher, 1995; Marga ret, 2004;
Femenia, 1987).
In other words, what I try to show is that motherhood is an ideological status that is
defined by different power struggles. Although mostly being a mother is accepted as a
significant role of a woman and respected, as is seen in the example, not every mother is
accepted in a respectful way—only as long as a woman’s motherhood stays within their
(nationalism, religion, the state or the army) definitions of mother. An example from Turkey
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for that discussion can be Saturday Mothers. Since May 1995 relatives of those who have
"disappeared" in police custody hold a weekly vigil in Istanbul (Cited in
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/017/1998). The Saturday mothers were
asking about their beloveds, who went missing under detention, and calling on the
government to take legal action against those responsible. However, although they are
mothers, their motherhood did not prevent the police from harassing them.
Briefly, an interdisciplinary range of recent feminist studies has diluted and held up
for questioning the conflation of motherhood with peace, sacrifice and nurturing (Di
Leonardo, 1985; Ruddick, 1989). According to Ruddick (1989), motherhood has a soci alpolitical significance, since from its practice peace-aspiring patterns of thinking and
awareness have to emerge. This notion has been severely criticized by other feminist
scholars, who see womanhood and motherhood as socially constructed, having no
predetermined values, attitudes, or habits. Therefore, patriarchal system’s positioning of
women, especially mothers, within war is based in discourse on essential differences between
woman and man due to their nature. Man is the creator of civilization and woman is the
element of the continuity of generations. In this discourse, male identity is equal to “culture,
political, wisdom, justice, public, power, universality and freedom”; female identity is equal
to “nature, personal, emotional, private, morality, obedient” (Pateman, 2004: 124). There are
various explanations about why theories of nationalism overlook the gender side. With
reference to motherhood, women are described as the passive object of men’s sacrifice, thus
depriving women of their agency as historical subjects in charge of their own destiny.
Mothers in Argentina have been able to challenge the historical narratives of the state and
construct competing ones.
In that context, nationalist narratives of mothers of martyrs slide easily from the
iconography of nation as woman to the construction of woman as nation, figuring women as
motherland, the fecund body of the nation. This narrative is translated into moral
imperative, requiring women both to represent the nation through moral virtue and social
norms, and to reproduce the national group in biological as well as cultural terms. These
images honor the women keeping Turkish national culture alive while their men were
resisting foreign invasion during war. Not only have mothers of martyrs been used as a
symbol of the nation’s security, but in their image, contemporary Turkish women are
particularly targeted as strategic to the conservative battle to preserve the nation and its
security. Women became a part of this discourse, not only as wives of military men, but also
as mothers of the military nation, who themselves gave birth to warriors. As mothers and
wives, they were responsible for “reproducing” and “supporting” the nation’s military force.
Situation in Turkey, Relation between Nationalism and Religion:
In this study, I apply the territorial nationalism that can explain Turkish nationalism
when it is considered in relation between national security and martyr and examine how
mothers of soldiers are applied for the justification of the conflict process in East and South
East of Turkey. It is worthwhile exploring a little further the linkages between Turkish
nationalism and one of its characteristics: territory which can define relationship between
martyrdom and nation in the case of Turkish nationalism. There is more to link nationalism
to territory than just the changing configurations of the world political map: territory plays a
central role both in nationalist identity and in nationalist strategy. The use of territoriality
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gives a nation an absolutist and historically continuous presence. In general, a specific
geographical area becomes associated with a particular collectivity, in the eyes of its
members. This relationship between people and land is the product of continual mythmaking. In this way, a particular territory is historicized. They become essential elements of
the community’s history, and the land becomes a historic homeland, “our land” (Smith,
1986: ch 8). Our land is where we can realize ourselves and our destiny/existence depends
on it. That creates a special bond of holiness between the community and its homeland, as
well as the piety and awe which surrounds the tombs of warriors, martyrs, laid to rest in the
land of their people. Territorial heritages provide the patterns within which elites operate in
order to mobilize large numbers. In other words, the ideal of self-renewal and the vision of
collective destiny are built upon the territory and justify all the sacrifices that citizens may be
asked to make. Nationalism had to inculcate a profound, keen identification with motherland
as a sacred and inviolable ancestral homeland, the only guarantor of its history and destiny.
In all these cases, large numbers of people have been mobilized and martyred in the defense
of lands. Where these lands are by tradition sanctified, the site of sacred acts and memories
can be evoked, and even larger numbers of people can be mobilized for battle and death.
In Turkish nationalism, a crucial role is played by territoriality. In that sense, if we
admit that the nation-state is an "invention" of the late 18th and the 19th centuries, we can
trace how these new states no longer legitimized by divine right sought, and finally instituted,
a new basis for their existence. One of the ways to acquire legitimation was to claim that the
same people had inhabited the same territory for hundreds of years, being united by bonds
of blood, culture, tradition, language, religion, and the like. In the heyday of nationalism
historical and philological departments were often established or expanded so as to lend
their services to the proving of such assertions. In that sense, the basis of the new republic
was to be found in loyalty both to the homeland Anatolia and to the Turkish nation that
inhabited it. All citizens of the Turkish state were deemed constitutionally Turks, and this
was the broader, political meaning applied to the term “Turk.” Remaining legal barriers
between the different communities were eliminated and great efforts were made to instill a
sense of patriotism in all members of the population. Conceptualization of Turkish history
as a history of high civilization among Turks also provides “an organic unity” (Berktay, 1990:
63). This fabricated glorious territory was a panacea for Turkish pride. Decades of
indoctrination and a heavy dose of nationalist education created a deep sense of pride in
being a Turk. This pride links the individual attachment to national identity. This political
affirmation of the pride may stretch from the language of the group becoming an official
language to make people believe the importance of sacrificing for the sake of the territory:
nation.
Broadly speaking, this involved two processes; the national re-education of the
young, and the inculcation of a spirit of self-sacrifice. The knowledge and the love of the
homeland became therefore an integral part of a national programme of mass education, and
it drew on the prior attachments of the people to their nation. As far as education was
concerned, this meant a mass standardization of outlook, values, knowledge and skills in a
national framework around the trinity of literature, history and geography. As Smith (1986:
243) points out, these were pre-eminent disciplines for imbuing the young with a national
outlook and feeling, for they revealed the inner rhythms of the nation and its profound roots
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in the past. As Altınay (2004: 126) examines in her work, the textbooks used throughout the
1970s and the early 1980s make similar claims: “Turks have formed states in all hi storical
epochs. Turkey has won many legendary victories as the greatest military nation of the
world.” For early 1990s, the textbooks include passages that define “love for homeland” as
the greatest passion of Turks (Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi, 1990: 262) and “heroism” as a spirit that
is a hereditary. In Turkey, education and educators have been giving a nationalizing and
militarizing role from the early years of nation building. Students throughout Republican
History have been told that they are members of a “heroic” race and they should prove this
by being good soldiers. Such re-education was not an end in itself. It served to prepare the
spirit of the young for a life of service to the nation, and if necessary, of heroic martyrdom.
Under this framework, we should deal with another unique character of Turkish
nationalism: its relation with religion. As it is indicated at the beginning, nationalist
movements use all or some of the proto-nationalist elements during the nation building
process. Nationalism will be successful on the basis of how it actuates those elements such
as religion, culture, and language on the way of nation-state building processes. One of these
elements is religion. The role of religion in politics has received an enormous amount of
scholarly attention, and it is not the purpose of this study to review that literature. However,
it is seen that for the true nationalist hero is a martyr, sacrificing his life for his nation. Love
of sacred homeland inspires the martyr’s death as it is seen above. For centuries to now,
official representatives honor those who died for another sacred cause: the nation.
Consequently, the nation state is precious and holy, to worth dying for the sake of as much
as God. The social psychology of martyrdom may be viewed as the replacement of a
religious ideal by the secular nationalism. But the idea of martyr gives the ideal; the soldier
kills or may be killed for the cause. Thus, to be willing to “die for the cause” or to serve for
the higher ideal becomes the pledge statement of commitment. For that reason, it will be
useful to examine the role and impacts of religion in Turkish nationalism and political
culture since religion is an effective element to produce a meaningful world between
mothers who have little or no common characteristic besides martyrdom of their sons.
For Schnapper, nation is a political project aiming to establish a new community
(umma). This community is a community of citizens. In order to establish this kind of
community, secularism is needed symbolizing that “especially social network should be
national, I mean, political rather than religious.” However, neither nation was able to destroy
traditions nor secularism could provide state’s impartiality about religion, such that “holiness
delivers its meaning from religion to nation”, “nation and republic was transformed as a civil
religion with its litany, temple and saints”. (Cited in Kalaycı, 1998: 161)
Turkey emerged out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over three
continents. In this content, the Turkish nation state was built upon a range of potentially
opposing elements, tradition and modernization, secularism and religion, nationalism and
ethnicity, strategic location and neighborhood disputes, democracy and military political
action. Since 1923, during social-political and cultural transformation, religion was the most
confused subject we faced. From empire to republic, during the building process of a Turk
nation-state, the most comprehensive intervention was made to religion. As far as I
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understood from Atay (1998: 100), by this way, ruling elites were not attempting to erase
religion from the country. What they wanted to do was not to refuse the religion. On the
contrary, for Tapper and Tapper, they wanted to examine (or try to examine) religion in a
new way and they wanted to re-define it (Atay, ibid, 100). Among newly occurred (or
established) nation state’s borders, it was aimed to develop a “religion” which was linked to
those borders. In a more arrogant way, if we say, it was assumed to create a “Turkish Islam”
rather than “Islam.” Mardin remarks that “the only way to free oneself from Islamic society
is to establish an alternative Islamic society” (Mardin, 2000: 72). Claim of universality of that
religion which had existed in that land with its historical, cultural and social dynamics did not
fit into the newly established nation state’s borders. Consequently, it was forced to be
suitable and dependent to this new establishment. The most basic goal of secularism was the
separation of the state and religion. However, as Berkes argues, Kemalist secularism did not
let religion have its own autonomous existence. Religion was placed under government
authority as the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Berkes, 1964: 479).
First attempts to approach the religion in republican political practices with the aim
of “ulusallık” can be counted as Turkification of Qur’an, Turkish call to God (ezan),
Turkification of worship practices. For Zürcher, secularism was not only the separation of
state and religion, but also was throwing religion out of the public sphere and establishing
full control of the state over the rest of religious institutions. Ultra-nationalist thinking and
creating historical myths (Turkish History Thesis or Sun Language Theory) were used to
constitute a new national identity. In this way, nationalism replaced religion in most aspects
of society (Zürcher, 2004: 264). As mostly common speech, “Türk’ün yeni amentüsü” (Turk's
new credo) was nationalism (Yıldız, 2001: 213). In that point, nationalism has grown upon
references of daily and social lives of people. Nationalism has been positioned as a kind of
religion with its holiness, temples, idols, symbols, etc. Religion is seen as a system that should
dissolve and a system that is supposed to dissolve. Nevertheless, there is an important
paradox of modern national identity. On one hand, religion represents “old regime” that
should be destroyed and, on the other hand, it represents a system that modern nation keeps
limited in the private sphere in order to justify its power. By this way, although practices
lived in the context of nationalism do not refer directly to religion, it provides continuity of
infected religiousness. Generally these people are considered to be unable to explain
rationally what was happening around them and tend to resort to identifying visible factors
to which they attribute blame and support ideologies that can help explain their position. For
example, martyrdom discourse based on religion is used to explain the death of soldiers in
the armed conflict in Turkey between military in Turkey and PKK. Although versions of
‘thou shalt not kill’ reverberate through all religious codes, religious beliefs have shaped the
way we justify and attribute meaning to killing.
In Turkey, religious reference cherishes national reference or national reference
cherishes religious reference. Being a Muslim and being a Turk has been lived together.
Though many citizens continue to think of themselves as Muslims first, and Turks
afterwards, for most people, Turk is equated with Muslim. Consequently, in that case,
religion is linked with the extension of legitimacy to the polity in several ways. In that case, if
I summarize, religion is linked with the extension of legitimacy to the polity in several ways.
As Ilter Turan (1991: 42-50) claims, first, religion provides a framework within which
political power may be exercised. In other words, it is a constraint on what governments can
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do and still maintain their legitimacy.
Second, religion is an element of social control that includes values such as being
respectful to governmental authority and public servants, and compliance with government’ s
command. In this way, religion is one of several ways through which obedience to political
authority is secured. As Binnaz Toprak expresses, since religion has a control system over
individuals, how is it possible not to take into consideration of religion while making
politics? (Toprak, 1986: 359-367). In other words, if it is asked of people to make political
choices, and those people’s world of consciousness and emotions can be determined by
religion, how can applying religious references while making politics be avoided? The nation
state, which did not want to share its power with anybody, could degrade religion, which
again could keep its consistency with only the idea of not sharing power with anybody, as a
functional element for the sake of its power. These, somehow, have given holiness to
“national culture” and become functional to glue elements of “national identity” which were
being re-created during the nation state building process.
Finally, religion is a source of symbols, ideas and meanings that are used to elicit
positive political behaviors from society. A few examples may help to explain what is meant
here. A person who dies in battle for the cause of religion is a şehit-martyr- and goes directly
to heaven. Now this symbol has been borrowed from religious vocabulary, and is used to
describe any public servant who dies in the course of public duty; in this way, government
service is elevated to the level of God’s cause. Religion in symbols sometimes is nationalized
with flags at mosques. In Greece and South Cyprus, a flag is used at church. In 1997, one of
the slogans of Nationalist Movement Party was “Nation of Turk is Muslim. They will live
Islam and live in Islam.” Turgut Özal said: “State is laic but I’m Muslim.” Friday sermons
are used to invite citizens to engage in acts supportive of government. The Directorate of
religious Affairs sends out model sermons to imams (preachers) that may encourage the
citizens, for example, to pay their taxes, or to contribute to foundations established to assist
armed forces; thus, secular acts are identified as being religiously desirable, and they gain an
aura of religious legitimacy. To put it briefly, it seems that the Turkish state, while not
viewing religion as giving direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a
resource which may be mobilized for “purpose of state” whenever it is found useful or
necessary.
In conclusion, as Sakallıoğlu (1996: 250) points out, early republican strategy toward
Islam showed two trends, one repressive, the other, a combination of the ideals of secular
nationalism with Islamic symbols. In other words, what I tried to prove is that from the
beginning of the Turkish nation-state, religion is constructed in the system to justify positive
political behaviors. Although there is not an official religion of Turkey at the state level, this
nation has a religion that people die for. For that reason, mothers of martyrs said that their
sons are martyrized for this nation, territory (vatan için ölmek, şehit olmak). It can be easily
understood then why the secular concept nationalism is linked with martyrdom and death is
justified with a religious concept, martyr when the role of religion in Turkish nationalism is
considered. After the relation between nationalism and religion, we should look at the issue
of martyrdom in which this relation reaches its peek point.
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Notion of Martyrdom:
Individuals have died and been killed; in fact, millions of individuals during the 20th
century died from war, torture, accidents or etc. Some deaths are memorialized and some are
identified as martyrs. This is a function of attribution that distinguishes certain individuals
and ways of dying from others, which have been no less significant, but probably less forged
in memory. The human mind struggles to put meaning on six million individuals, but can
form from a symbolic individual. To die for a cause in itself cannot be a measure of
anything; rather it is an accident or incident en route to a goal.
While there are many martyrs to be found in history, few are chosen to be
representative of a given movement, belief system or people. Of those few, even fewer speak
across cultural boundaries and become national in their reach. It is more common for the
bloody details to be spelt out in detail, and for the audience to be brought up to the moment
of collective guilt and sorrow through the ritual of narration of the endless suffering of the
martyr.
The term martyr is officially recognized by national representatives. As Fouché
claimed, the status of martyr appeared as one of the means to get recognition (Cited in,
Rosoux, 2004: 110). Indeed, this concept appears to be much more dramatic than the usual
notion of “victim.” Here again it is noticeable that the quality of dead as “victim” or as
“martyr” is not just a question of vocabulary. The conversion of a victim into a martyr is
generally business of official representation. As Agamben said, the important thing is that
“This holly life, from the beginning, has a political character and is related with the land
where power in rule is established” (Agamben, 2001: 135).
History affords many examples of the use of martyrdom as propaganda and
inspirational tool. Therefore, the martyr himself becomes a living definition of the intrinsic
nature of the nation for which he was willing to die. Some or all of the following uses can be
made of the martyr's death: the strength of his belief as attested to by his willingness to die
for his cause can inspire and consolidate the commitment of his followers or young
generation to their common cause; the strength of his belief as thereby attested can motivate
to action those who sympathized with the cause but are not yet participants; relating and
reciting the details of his sufferings can allow his coreligionists to experience his trauma
vicariously and thereby evoke a level of sympathy which can further animate the young
generation; the extent of the oppression of the system as evidenced by the system's
willingness to kill the martyr can radicalize the polarity between the righteousness of the
state's cause and the injustice of that against which they struggle; annual commemoration of
the martyr's death can serve to keep his sacrifice alive and present in the collective memory
and thus help to keep alive the aims and goals of the state; his death can be used as a
newsworthy event which can be reported to the outside world in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and external support.
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The martyr’s defining role is most helpful when that particular belief system/nation
is under attack within a given geographical location. He creates an example, a standard of
conduct by which to judge other fellow believers. By demonstrating publicly that there is
something in the subordinated or persecuted nation worth dying for, the value other
believers place upon it is augmented, and that nation is highlighted.
Observing the links between martyrdom and politics brings us closer to some of the
most teleological and ambivalent uses of death. As far as political approach is concerned, the
focus is on the representation of those who commemorate martyrdom. As dead martyrs no
longer speak, this representation reveals the process of the decision. Indeed “martyrs are
made not simply by their beliefs and actions but by those who witnessed them, remembered
them and told their story” (Kassimir, 1991: 62, cited in Rosoux, 2004: 83). So what are the
purposes of political uses of martyrdom? In order to have a common will in t he present,
common glories in the past are needed. This means that shared suffering is more important
than shared joy. When national memories are concerned, grievances are of more value than
triumphs, for which they impose duties, and require a common effort. In insisting on
notions like “sacrifice”, “grief”, or “shared suffering”, it shows that they have special
urgency in the framework of nation building. The devotion to their heroic memory is a
significant means whereby communities, political or religious, maintain their internal
cohesion and control their social formation (Wood, 1993: 91-92). In this framework, the
figure of martyr is revealed as particularly useful to maintain national identity, especially in a
crisis situation. In the context of war, the emphasis of martyrdom is a powerful weapon
since it can lead to the identification of the persecutors with the devil. When tragic events
are constantly recalled during an international or intercommunity conflict, they can be used
as incentives in order to redress suffering. In that case, the purpose is not only to reinforce
the national cohesion. It is above all to justify a feeling of hatred for the enemy. According
to Rosoux, this emotional rhetoric of the martyr pursues three main aims (Rosoux, ibid, p.
100).
First of all, it is pedagogical. The supreme sacrifice of the martyr constitutes an
example and a guide for the population. It remains one of the key founding references of
national identity. Martyr is not only used to edify young generations. The second purpose of
this commemoration is directly linked to political circumstances. Crisis moments traumatize
or deeply divide society. In such a context, the primary object of the martyrdom is to restore
a sense of self-esteem and a form of unity among the society; to gather all the segments of
society around one central figure and to focus their attention on an unequivocally heroic
fate; to unify society against the enemy, and his tragic martyrdom became the unifying
narrative. Remembering martyrs is a shared icon of a common history.
Finally, a third is that the commemoration of the martyr is used to legitimate the
politicians themselves. The term martyr is officially recognized by national representatives.
The status of martyr appeared as one of the means to get recognition (Fouché, 2002: 126,
cited in Rosoux, ibid, p. 110). Indeed, this concept appears to be much more dramatic than
the usual notion of “victim.” Here again it is noticeable that the quality of dead as “victim”
or as “martyr” is not just a question of vocabulary. The conversion of a victim into a martyr
is generally the business of official representation. As Agamben said, the important thing is
here: This holly life, from the beginning, has a political character and is related with the land

37
where power in rule is established (Agamben, ibid, 135). The major function of it is to
legitimate the state and state authority.
In that sense, one can argue that crisis moments traumatize society or deeply divide
society. In such a context, the primary object of the martyrdom is to restore a sense of selfesteem and a form of unity among the society; to gather all the segments of society around
one central figure and to focus their attention on an unequivocally heroic fate; to unify
society against the enemy, and his tragic martyrdom became the unifying narrative.
Remembering martyrs is a shared icon of a common history. This stage of the martyrdom is
of crucial importance, perhaps even more crucial than the actual suffering and martyrdom
itself. Those stories that have become national are among the most moving and dramatic
that humanity has produced and continue to inspire people, generation after generation.
Stories of glorification, as Smith (1986) underlines, are tools mostly applied in building of a
nation and to build or fill the collective memory since these records of memory invite people
to take lessons from the deaths for the sake of the nation’s future. In this way, the martyr is
granted stature and nobility out of the mouths of his own persecutors and enemies. For
example, it is mostly repeated at demonstrations against PKK and terrorism in Turkey:
“Martyrs do not die and our nation cannot be divided into parts.”6 In that sense, I should
look at different meanings of martyrdom in religion in order to evaluate how the concept,
itself, obtained the highest prestige for individuals that people can be manipulated to die for.
Notion of Martyrdom in Religion:
Martyrdom exists as an active and powerful force in the ideology of Islam and to
understand why it has such powerful roots and such great symbolic weight, it is necessary to
examine the different levels at which the concept manifests itself. In Islam, martyrs are called
“witnesses” because their souls witness paradise, their deaths are witnessed by angels, or
their wounds will testify to their dignified status in the afterlife. To fully understand the
religious and socio-political contexts of both types of martyrdom in Islam, one needs to
examine their religious and historical grounds in the Qur’an and hadith. 7 According to
Saloul, in Islamic tradition, there are two main forms of martyrdom: martyrdom in war and
spiritual martyrdom of asceticism. 8
The first, martyrdom in war, is the most obvious form: someone who dies in battle
for his religious belief. In Islamic history, this form is the earliest form of martyrdom and it
In Turkish, “Şehitler ölmez, vatan bölünmez.”
Hadith is the documentation of Prophet Mohammed’s statements and actions which were
pres erved from original oral transmissions. Hadith exists in a variety of degrees of reliability. While
most of Hadi th are accurate, some may have been fabricated, whether due to sincere
misunderstandi ngs or by devious i ntent. Since this project examines the religious thought of
believers and not historical events, the veracity of hadith will not be an issue: a hadith reflects belief
whether transmitted by a careful historian or consciously manufactured to promote an agenda. In
this paper I will support my argument by using Hadith from Sahih Al -Bukhari, which is considered by
the majori ty of Muslims as an accurate and valid collection of Hadi th. Quotations from Sahih Al Bukhari taken from the internet: Link name "Hadith Bukhari (English Translation)"; URL
http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/bukhari/index.htm.
8
Available
at
http://home.medewerker.uva. nl/i.a.m.saloul/bestanden/Martyrdom,%20gender%20and%20cultur
al%20identity.pdf
6
7
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is primarily related to the concept of Jihad, often translated as “holy war”. 9 The Qur’an
refers to martyrdom in war and the rewards of martyrs in many places.
And say not of those who are slain in the Way of God: 'They are dead.'
Nay, they are living, though you perceive it not. Think not of those who
are slain in God's way as dead. Nay they live, finding their sustenance in
the Presence of their Lord....the (Martyrs) glory in the fact that on them is
no fear, nor have they (cause to) grieve. They rejoice in the Grace and the
Bounty from Allah. (Qur’an, 3:169-71)
The martyr is highly positioned in Islamic tradition. Thus battlefield martyrs are put
in a special category as “martyrs in this world and the next” and are honored with special
burial rites. The martyr’s body, in most circumstances, is not washed; he is to be buried in
the clothes in which he was killed. Some hold that no prayers over the martyr are necessary
since he is automatically purified from sin. The lesser categories of martyrs are “martyrs of
the next world” meaning, chiefly, that they are not eligible for special burial rites but must be
satisfied with divine approbation and the rewards of paradise (Berenbaum and Firesone,
2004: 140).
The second form of martyrdom is the spiritual martyrdom of asceticism. Spiritual
martyrdom refers to a martyr who is killed for his/her faith or murdered while in the service
of God, but who does not necessarily die in battle.10 According to Kohlberg, the category of
martyrs was extended greatly after the decrease in the number of battlefield martyrs
following early conquests (Cited in Berenbaum and Firesone, 2004: 141). The category of
martyr was enlarged to include many kinds of death, including drowning, pleurisy, plague, or
diarrhea. According to other traditions martyrs also include those who die in childbirth,
those who die defending their property, those who are eaten by lions, and those who die of
seasickness. The trend culminated in the transference of the value of martyrdom to other
religious acts, so that death was no longer the most important prerequisite. Within this
theological basis, martyrdom is portrayed as the highest privilege of Islam that contains two
main sources of belief. While the first emphasizes the importance of Jihad and its different
forms and meanings, the second describes the glory of the martyrdom act.

“A MOTHER OF A MARTYR” AS A RECONSTRUCTED IDENTITY
As Zisook remarks, “Mourning experience, the loss of the loved one because of
death, is a universal phenomenon that most people deal with for once or more in their life
time” (Cited in Olgun and Yüksel, 2001). This painful loss affects both the individual’s
emotional world and social functions. In that sense, mothers, especially mothers of martyrs,
are the most popular icons of nationalist discourse. However, their voices have not been
heard. That is why it is important to focus on the mothers’ narratives to show how
Some writers claims that while the Qur’an frequently refers to war, the words used for war are
“harb” and “”qital”. Translating Jihad as “holy war” would be incorrect in this context, for the literal
translation of holy war “harb muqaddasa”, is not to be found in either the Qur’an or hadith
(Montgomery, 1976: 155).
10 A fuller presentation of these themes can be found in Jonah Winters, "Martyrdom in Jihad"
(unpublished paper; University of Toronto, 1997). Accessed from the internet: Li nk name
"Martyrdom in Jihad"; URL http://bahai -library.com/personal/jw/my.papers /jihad.html.
9

39
nationalist discourse builds “mother of martyr” as a social category, not as a social actor.
In this context, as Hall underlines, identities are constructed by different discourses,
practices, and positions that intersect with each other and are antagonistic (Hall, 1996: 4).
Such theories of subjectivity reject the humanist notion of a unified, fixed self that has a
stable, essential core, and instead proposes the self as a site of disunity and conflict that is
always in process and constructed within power relations (Weedon, 1997). The social
structures and processes that shape our subjectivities are situated within discursive fields
where language, social institutions, subjectivity, and power exist, intersect, and produce
competing ways of giving meaning to and constructing subjectivity (De Lauretis, 1986;
Weedon, 1997). Identities emerge in the midst of social relations, as constructivists argue
(Cornell and Hartman, 1997: 81).
In this vein, answers for the questions of “Who are you?” or “Would you introduce
yourself?” are about one’s perception of identity. It is about how you introduce yourself to
someone and how you feel about yourself. In other words, perception of identity includes
both “given” characteristics and an “essence,” and it also has socially constructed
characteristics. As Harold R. Isaacs mentions in his book, Idols of Tribe, identity includes
several features: common descent, shared history, and religion (Isaacs, 1989: 38). Ident ity
may originate from either assignment by others or assertion by self. Whatever criteria are
used to distinguish one’s identity from other identities, in this chapter I will focus on
mothers’ narratives in order to understand how the trauma of the loss of a loved one shapes
these mothers’ self-identity and their perception of motherhood.
How the Loss of A Son Shapes the Perceptions of Self-Identity of Mothers and Fathers:
There is no doubt that bereaved mothers (and other family members) are, like their
sons, victims of a trauma. Is their loss any different because their sons were killed in a war
rather than by disease or a car accident? In what way is this trauma a social phenomenon as
well as a personal experience? After establishing the field of meanings constituted by the
multiple discourses of death, I turned to a second question: What are the social effects of
their sons’ martyrdom on the women as mothers? Any study of how people respond to
death must also be a study of how they create their lives. Thus, a study of laments must
include an inquiry into how the social practices of bereavement may contribute to
maintaining a particular form of social life.
Geertz (Cited in Bora, 1998: 83) defines culture as “meaning patterns which are told
from generation to generation and symbolic structures that explain attitudes and information
of individuals about life.” As Bora (1998:84) points out, the “culture of motherhood” can be
considered as an ideological interpretation. In this context, nationalist discourses interact
with political institutions and manipulate social and cultural practices to imprint gendered
identities on embodied subjects, attempting to make them malleable within the power
struggles of the nation-building or nation-defending process. I aim to demonstrate the
interaction of gendered discourses with normative notions of nationalism and religion in the
service and reproduction of the national idea. For that reason, I attempt to learn about these
mothers’ understanding of being “a mother of martyr” while beginning to ask them about
“who they are.”
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At first, mothers of martyrs perceived the question of “who they are” as strange and
unfamiliar. After I changed the structure of the question and asked them for information
about themselves, they talked about their sons and their families. For example, Ayşe (57,
housewife, lost her son 13 years ago) says:
Well, I am a mother of a martyr, and a housewife. Well, how do I
introduce myself? I am a mother who raises her children and sends them
to school for years.
Another mother, Meryem (45, housewife, lost her son 14 years ago) says:
I am a mother of a martyr. (…) Well, I got married when I was young. I
became a mother at the age of sixteen. Then, I had problems with my
husband. I had problems with the father of my children. (…) As of now, I
am a mother of four children.
Moreover, Ayşe Naciye (63, member of the Association of Families of Martyrs, lost her son
15 years ago) says:
I am a mother of a martyr.
As can be seen in the above quotations, each woman, first of all, defined herself
within familial networks. These narratives show that those mothers perceive themselves not
as independent individuals, but rather as a part of a family. Those mothers represent the
conventional roles of woman. They remain loyal to conventional family bonds as altruistic
mothers who care for their sons and families before themselves, before their own needs and
interests. They do not consider themselves as individuals. They are, first of all, someone’s
mothers. It is true that they have experienced trauma, important changes in their lives and
lifestyles after their sons’ martyrdoms. However, they maintain the patriarchal bonds within
conventional family structure.
On the other hand, for fathers of martyrs, the question of “who they are” is not an
unexpected question. Furthermore, their answers include more personal information, in
contrast to mothers’ answers. Although they also define themselves in familial bonds, they
give more priority to personal information. For example, Hamit (57, Second Chairman of
the Association of Families of Martyrs, lost his son 10 years ago) defines himself:
My name is Hamit, a father of a martyr. I was born in 1950. I am from
Sivas/Zara. I am retired. I have a son and a daughter.
Another father, Şükrü (65, Chairman of the Association of Families of Martyrs, lost his son
13 years ago) says:
My name is Şükrü. I am Chairman of the Association of Families of
Martyrs
Moreover, Kemal (55, General Secretary of Association of Families of Martyrs, lost his son
15 years ago) says:
My name is Kemal. I was born in Artvin/Arhavi. I was born on 24
December 1953. I had three sons. My first son was also an associate
officer in the same place, in the same city. Both of them went to the army
voluntarily. First one was discharged and came back. Mehmet had almost
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40 days to be discharged. Then, he could not come. He was martyred.
The quoted fathers are all members of the Association of Families of Martyrs. All of
them are retired civil servants. However, when asked who they are, they tend to speak about
themselves. It is perceived that fathers consider their self-identity to extend beyond their
familial bonds. Moreover, they are aware that the answer to a question about their identity
depends on their personal characteristics.
Another difference between the fathers and the mothers is that many mothers failed
to give their names in their introductions. On the other hand, almost all fathers provided
their names first. They knew that I knew their names; however, they still included their
names first in their introductions. Mothers called themselves “mothers of martyrs” before
offering their names, although they knew I had come to ask them about themselves. So then
what does it mean to be the “mother of a martyr”?

What Does It Mean To Be “A Mother of a Martyr”?
In this section, my aim is not to give a clear definition of what a “mother of a
martyr” is or is not; rather I want to provide a picture of what it means to be such a mother,
by the actions and practices of the mothers themselves. I argue that those mothers’ identities
are constructed through nationalist discourse and religion, as Hall claims that each subject
position is a reflection of a discursive practice. Mothers of martyrs are constructed in
accordance with conventional gender roles, and the structure demands that they apply those
roles in being a mother of a martyr. Giving meanings, by nationalist and religious discourse,
to death by martyrdom transforms those mothers as “mothers of martyrs” and endows them
with a special status both in society and in religion.
First, in the discourse of nationalism or the recreation of an “imagined community,”
it is crucial to build national consciousness. The transference of personal motives and
meanings to public and political symbols contributes to an understanding and explanation of
a martyr’s death. Before, they were only “ordinary” housewives, but with their sons’
martyrdom, they have become “mothers of the nation,” known by all and respected by
statesmen and commanders. They have found themselves in new roles and new subject
positions. As a result of this, these mothers answer the question above by stating, “I’m a
mother of a martyr.” First and foremost, the factor defining their identities is that they are
mothers of martyrs.
As indicated above, while martyrdom sanctifies and glorifies the martyr in social and
religious realms, it also provides prestige for the relatives of martyrs, especially for their
mothers. When I began to look carefully at the ways people talked about death, the crucial
role of one element—religious faith—became apparent. Like the discourse of honor,
religious discourse builds itself on lamentation. Faith in God has to be seen, for men and
women, as another moral register in which to read people's practices. This construction of
religion’s place has two consequences. First, it enables mournfulness to become a special
statement about the meaning of death. When women lament and wail, they are accepting
God's will. Second, this configuration makes people's responses to death relevant to their
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social standing. This is where the gendering of the discourses of death becomes significant.
Like the code of honor, religious faith provides for mothers of martyrs a principle of social
differentiation, a standard by which people can be ranked. They benefit from these
principles. Through such enactments of piety they offset some of the negative effects of
their inability (because of their economic dependence).
In that sense, martyrdom, as it is discussed above, is a sanctified and exalted event in
the eyes of religion. It is believed that both the martyr and his family will be comfortable in
the afterlife. They will be rewarded by God. This is a way to cope with the loss of a son: to
achieve something sanctified, special, and prestigious in religion. Mothers own this prestige
obtained by their sons’ death after martyrdom. By making these mothers comfortable, it also
provides them socially important status. Before, these mothers were only ordinary
housewives; after martyrdom, they were recognized and remembered by important
statesmen, politicians, and commanders. Prestige obtained by martyrdom is not limited to
religion. It also has a social side. “Dying for the sake of the nation” is the highest status that
can be obtained by those soldiers. Dying for the sake of the nation, providing an important
service for society, assures this respected status for the martyr and his family. This newly
obtained social and religious prestige makes up for the loss of family, especially for mothers.
In this way, life after martyrdom becomes more bearable.
Comparison of Sunni Mothers with Alevi Mothers:
In light of this understanding of martyrdom, why are Alevi mothers affected by the
idea of martyrdom, defining themselves as mothers of martyrs, when they do not believe in
an afterlife like Sunni mothers do? There are, I consider, two major reasons for this. First,
like Sunni mothers, Alevi mothers must deal with the sudden loss of their beloved sons. This
death is seen as pointless, because those mothers were waiting for their sons to return home
at the end of their military service. The situation is especially tragic because it usually
involves a young man of about twenty. It is perhaps the suddenness of these deaths that
makes it so terrible at first, because without any logical reason or warning, a mother has lost
her son. Mothers, whether Alevi or Sunni, claim that this pain cannot be understood by one
who has not experienced it. The only way to cope with the pain is by glorifying the death in
an attempt to give meaning and prestige to the martyrdom. The mothers’ narratives present
various ways to make sense of a senseless death. Alevi mothers give meaning to this sudden
death not by religion, as Sunni mothers do, but rather by nationalism, emphasizing that their
sons died for the sake of the nation. Alevi mothers do not place so much importance
religious benefits of martyrdom, such as the son and his family being rewarded in heaven,
because they do not perceive death as an end. It is easily seen in the narratives of Alevi
mothers that they call themselves “mothers of martyrs” because their sons died protecting
the nation; in nationalist discourse, such a man is called a “martyr.”
Second, rituals related to death can vary among Alevis depending on whether they
live in the city or the country, or due to their level of education. Because Alevi doctrine is
based on oral, rather than written, history, and lacks “certain rules,” as in other faiths, due to
differences between city life and country life, and regional demographics, it can be said that
Alevis develop different rituals and beliefs about death. Most importantly, when they migrate
to the cities, Alevi people have to apply to the municipality for their funeral or death rituals,
because Alevi houses of gathering (cemevi) are not officially accepted as responsible for such
work, not being officially recognized as places of worship. Therefore, the tradition of
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mosques and imams has started to enter Alevi practice, though not an original part of Alevi
doctrine. Secularization did not, however, bode the end of the widespread Sunni prejudices
against the Alevis. The Alevis’ gradual integration into the wider society, along with their
movement to the towns and entry into education and careers in public service, brought them
into closer contact, and sometimes into direct competition, with Sunnis. The official attitude
toward Islam since 1980 has represented an even greater departure from the Kemalist
tradition, actively fostering a Turkish-Islamic synthesis that began as a doctrine combining
fervent Turkish nationalism and Islamic sentiment. Religious education, previously an
optional subject, was made obligatory; the Directorate of Religious Affairs was strengthened;
numerous new mosques were built and imams were appointed, not only in Sunni towns and
villages, but also in Alevi communities. Alevis no longer had a unique religion to which they
could turn, because the institutions of traditional Alevi thought were almost entirely eroded.
Alevis are not allowed to learn their own values and rituals. Consequently, Sunni beliefs fill
the gaps where Alevi thought is missing in Alevis’ lives. As an unavoidable result of
assimilation, Sunni beliefs have blended into Alevi beliefs. Additionally, although Alevis have
a fear of assimilation and criticize the state politics that cause this process, Sunni beliefs or
rituals can still become dominant in their daily life, despite the fact that those rituals or ideas
are not indigenous to Alevi thought. Martyrdom is the best example of this. Although Sunnis
and Alevis have different beliefs, they live side by side in cities. Naturally, they can affect
each other. As the state continues to impose Sunni beliefs on Alevis, it is impossible for
Alevi mothers to not be impressed by Sunni views of martyrdom; nothing else exists to give
meaning to their sons’ sudden deaths.
To sum up, if we consider the link between gender and nationalism, we face
motherhood as a significantly subjective identity, either supporting nationalism or
challenging it. Since the 1980s, in southeast Turkey, an armed struggle has been raging
between the PKK and the Turkish army. In this process, mothers enter the public sphere
with different demands. Most mothers of martyrs have been seen in the public sphere
internalizing patriotism and nationalism in order to support the Turkish army demand of
revenge for their dead sons. In that context, I believe that motherhood has a critical identity
role in Turkey, in constantly producing militarism. The most crucial role of women is, from
the beginning of the nation-building process, to raise children suitable for a militarist,
nationalist and patriarchal structure, or, in other words, to be a mother. The mother who has
lost her son in a war, defending the homeland, has been one of the most powerful images of
hegemonic nationalist culture. In public discourse, the mother frequently represents the
nation itself. Therefore, a mother cannot demand a right to her son’s life and cannot
question his loss in war, since, as a mother of the nation, she gave birth to a son of the
nation, and whenever the nation asks for him, she should give him up. The individual loss of
each son is also a collective, national loss. While held up as public symbols, however,
bereaved mothers of the martyrs are silenced by society, their voices not to be heard. For
both mothers and fathers, the highest level of valor is in carrying their pain in silence.
In this sense, the focus on mothers of martyrs has increased, and they are seen more
often in the media, on television and in newspapers, in Turkey. A particularly common scene
involves a mother crying at the funeral of her son, shouting that, if she had another son, she
would send him to war, too, while cursing the PKK. There are many other expressions of
this trend. Women speak in public, in emotional and personal terms, about their sons. Many
mothers resent ready-made clichés of national language concerning the tragedy of their sons.
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In other words, women, as mothers, are taking their rightful place as mourners of their sons,
and in doing so, they reproduce the entire discourse around death in nationalism. Funerals of
martyrs are rituals that enact a linkage between mothering, death and sacrifice, and the
nation in a way that publicly states and validates the mothers’ moral and political standing.
Attendees at funerals give a chorus of public, mournful recognition to maternal feelings of
loss and also assuage that loss by symbolically supporting the mother. For example, mothers
of martyrs demonstrated for the capital punishment of Abdullah Öcalan. One of those
women was a nurse, Yıldız.11The public met her as a proud but pained woman, the widow of
a petty officer martyred by the PKK. It is expected that these women, like all other female
citizens of Turkey, will obey the prototype for the ideal woman figure, as determined by the
elite men who shaped womanhood during the nation-building process (Kandiyoti, 1997). On
the other hand, for those mothers, acceptance of their situation transforms their narratives
of loss into narratives of resurgence. They experience a transition of self-identity, from
“poor, repressed women,” to “proud, patriotic women.”
In that sense, when those women come into public sphere with their motherhood
identity, they do not question unequal woman-man power relations based on religion and
nationalism. They cannot transform their objective position to subjective position. They
depend on being the wife of a man and mother of a son. Glorification of motherhood
prevents those women to participate in the public sphere as collective actors although those
mothers, especially mothers of martyrs, have the chance of shaping politics by inspiring from
their own experiences and lives. As Olgun and Yüksel said, for parents, the death of their
grown up son is the hardest loss from which to recover. However, they claim effects of
mourning are not limited with parents’ emotional worlds. It affects their social relations, too
(Olgun and Yüksel: 2001: 41). Almost twenty years of war in Turkey reflects as a trauma to
the lives of mothers who lost their sons in the war. Politics of war politicize women, or
rather, make them the “tools” or the “victims” of war politics. Moreover, this
“politicization” that is constructed over motherhood help to deepen the arguments of
politicians about the Kurdish question and national security.
Mothers’ Perception of National Security after Death of Their Sons:
Turkey is constructed as a militaristic nation through discourses of Turkish history.
As a result, military service is an unavoidable duty for men in society until recently; a man
who does not fulfill his military service is not accepted as a citizen of Turkey. While
motherhood is a way for women to symbolically establish their citizenship, military service
was a way for men to establish their own citizenship, since every Turk, supposedly, is born a
soldier.12 These mothers sent their young sons, between the ages of 20 and 25, to serve the
state. While waiting for the sons to come home at the end of their military service, the
women are suddenly confronted with grief and loss (evlat acısı): their sons have become
martyrs. These mothers do not send their sons away to the war, but rather to the state.
When their sons died for their duty to the state, mothers did not perceive their sons’ service
negatively, as a kind of violence. On the contrary, these mothers are proud of their sons’
military service for the religious and nationalist reasons I discussed above. As a result,
mothers hang up pictures of their sons in uniform everywhere in the house as a prestige
11
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In Turkey, apart from citizenship, if a man does not fulfill his military service, he cannot easily get
married or find a job.
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symbol. Plaques of service, medallions, and certificates of success are also displayed. It is
easily seen in the mothers’ narratives that the military conditions were not perceived as war
conditions. They simply sent their sons to the state. So, for those mothers, the patriarchal
values framing this structure are not perceived as problematic.
The only way they can cope with the loss is to attribute a certain value and prestige
to their sons’ deaths, sanctified by religion. They create special meaning in “martyrdom” to
make sense of their loss. Mothers describe their sons’ deaths as “destiny, predestination.”
They often ended their interviews with comments such as, “his fate (nasib)," "his life span
was short," or "when a person's life is up…" In their narratives, the women explored the
various ways to make sense of a senseless death. In the end, they believe, a person's time of
death is God-given or "written." Most essential to faith is an acceptance of God's will. All
the mothers I interviewed, including Alevis, hold that a person's time of death is determined
in advance by God; some say it is “written on his or her forehead.” For instance, Meryem
(45, housewife, lost her son 14 years ago) says:
May God rest his soul, there is nothing to do. Is it written on forehead or
is it God’s will? However, there is another point that if you believe in God
and in martyrdom, at the end, this is written on your forehead. There is
nothing to do.
War enters their mind with the death of their sons and is understood as a sole event:
terrorism. The women's stories and commentaries implied, on the one hand, that blame for
the death could be traced to human decisions or actions, or that their sons had died because
of the actions of the PKK. At the same time, they believe that all that happens, especially
death, is God's will. Thus, on one hand, these mothers do not question the deaths of their
sons. On the other hand, they ask for revenge from the state since their sons died for the
sake of the nation’s security. Discourse of martyrdom in religion placates people. It is
something that relieves the mothers from their suffering. It is a soothing thing, and its
promises of spiritual opulence helps mothers cope with the deaths. When people cannot
explain what is happening around them or to them on rational grounds, they are likely to
turn to traditional, religious analyses and remedies. Generally, these mothers are unable to
explain rationally what has happened to their sons, and they tend to seek explanations within
soothing religious traditions. As a natural result of this, these mothers are politically silenced
with a focus on “heroism” or “martyrdom.” Although their sons’ deaths seem senseless to
these mothers, the loss of a son does not demolish the legitimacy of the state in their eyes.
On the contrary, martyrdom with nationalist discourse and sanctification by religion only
strengthens the mothers’ bonds with the state.
Another interesting point is that in the case of mothers of martyrs, they are not only
the ones having grief but, in some situations, these mothers are asking for revenge for their
sons’ deaths. Moreover, these mothers, especially mothers of petty officers or officers, want
their grandsons to become officers or petty officers and give the necessary punishment for
those who killed their dads. After martyrdom, sons of martyrs become particularly special to
their mothers; sons of martyrs are seen as the ones who will take revenge for their fathers’
death. When we consider the sons of the martyrs, the sons have not entered the military for
financial reasons. Sons of martyrs, members of the Turkish Army Force, apply to military
school for “revenge” for the death of their fathers. As a result, these mothers are willing to
sacrifice other sons, if necessary.
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In this sense, when I asked these mothers what they think about peace for the
conflict in the East and Southeast of Turkey, they got surprised because, until now, they
have never been asked what they think about. Mostly, instead of these women, their
husbands deal with the problems. As a result, the concept of peace does not make sense for
their minds. When I asked the mothers to suggest solutions for the conflict in southeastern
Turkey, they said that the solution should come from the political institutions. But the lack
of a connection between political institutions and the women makes the words of the
mothers “apolitical” (Sancar, 2001). While the mothers’ words do show a true search for an
understanding of a solution, they do not hold the power or responsibility to actualize such a
solution. Their identity as mothers provides them the ability to speak in the public sphere,
but only about their sons. Apart from that topic, mothers remain passive and powerless in
the decision-making process. The politicization of mothers reproduces the “victimhood” of
women insofar as it fails to cooperate with a political movement against violence, militarism,
and exploitation.
Conclusion:
By exploring the narratives of mothers of martyrs, this study first gave an
understanding about being a mother of martyr within nationalism in Turkey, where
patriarchal values dominate. It is evident that patriarchal society’s underlying ideology
influences women’s evaluations of mothers of martyrs, and also their self-evaluations in
terms of ideal mothering qualities. Moreover, it can be said that the influence of martyrdom
reshapes women’s daily lives and identity. Second, it is seen that all mothers attribute great
worth to being a mother of a martyr, although more than half of them believe that a woman
is not given any independent value by society in general. Related to this fact, social and
personal responsibilities on the part of the mothers of martyrs was emphasized by most
mothers. The feelings of pride and sanctity are common among mothers.
The above narratives have made immensely valuable contributions to our
understanding of the relations between women, nationalism, security and war, and of the
construction of militarism through notions of motherhood and masculinity and their impact
on women’s lives. They have also produced key analytical frameworks and tools through
which women’s experiences and the relevance of martyrdom have been approached. This
approach often assumes a direct link between women’s agency and women’s participation in
the public sphere, and understands the discourse of war as potentially empowering,
especially when linked to the support of nationalist movements. This research on the
militarization of mothers’ lives, be it militarization through direct relations with the military,
or militarization through family associations, relied on the concept of women’s agency and
empowerment. However, as I argue, mothers’ presence in the public sphere or politics does
not seem to change the masculine nature of these institutions, nor does it contribute to a
general advancement of the mothers’ social positions. It does not tear away the legitimizing
camouflage that has sustained martyrdom as a symbol of national pride and security.
Depending on the conditions, motherhood is either sanctified or degrading. In the
case of mothers of martyrs, these mothers are sanctified in double ways. On one hand, they
are nationalist icons of the war. On the other hand, they are sanctified in religion by being
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rewarded with heaven. These women invoke the other discourses: references to God's will
or letting the men in the family/the army talk instead of themselves. In that sense, they are
valuable tools to justify policies of either the army or the governments about national
security in Turkey. As a result of this research, I claim that, while mothers’ roles do change
in war, even dramatically, and mothers do take on new responsibilities within the household,
community, or organizations. Instead, war is actually used to preserve gender roles and order
in Turkey. War, martyrdom, and nationalism become means of preserving, achieving, and
reclaiming dominant masculinity as well as dominant gender hierarchies based on national
security issues. From the interviews, it is seen that as a consequence of being a mother of a
martyr, these women gain the right to become visible, publicly known, and to participate in
the public sphere. However, they use this right not as an individual or as a woman, but by
depending on their newly gained identity of national motherhood. In short, with their sons’
martyrdom, they have begun to exist in the public sphere for the first time, gaining public
respect. However, this transformation, from ordinary housewives to mothers of martyrs, is
used to justify the discourse on national security issues. They do not question what
happened, or why. They are seen in the public sphere, but not as individuals. They are seen
as mournful mothers, speaking of the glories of their sons, both in the past and at the
present.
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